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PAYDAY LENDING: DO OUTRAGEOUS PRICES 
NECESSARILY MEAN OUTRAGEOUS PROFITS? 
Aaron Huckstep*
I. INTRODUCTION 
The payday lending industry has suffered from a poor public 
perception based at least in part on inconclusive data.  The public, 
hearing horror stories of payday loans gone wrong, appears to believe 
that the entire industry needs to be regulated.  One assumption for 
regulation is that payday lenders make an enormous profit from their 
services.1  This assumption is grounded in the relatively high cost of 
short-term credit obtained through payday lenders.2  As a response to 
poor public perception, the industry has searched to justify itself, falling 
on the explanation that operating costs and loan losses require the high 
fees associated with their loans.  Without hard data indicating that 
payday lenders are making extraordinary profits, however, this call for 
regulation is without foundation.  To date, no conclusive data has been 
presented to either justify or refute the claims of either consumer groups 
or the industry. 
This article does not suggest that payday lending is a desirable 
service, or that the industry should be entirely free from regulation.  
 * Senior Staff, Moss Adams LLP, Albuquerque, New Mexico; Graduate, 
University of Colorado at Boulder School of Law, May 2006.  The author thanks 
Professors Nathalie Martin and Frederick Hart of the University of New Mexico School 
of Law, Professor Mark Loewenstein of the University of Colorado School of Law, and 
University of New Mexico School of Law alumnus Justin Breen for their comments on 
earlier drafts of this article. 
 1. See Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending:  Do the Costs 
Jutify the Price? 1 (FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper, Paper No. 
2005/09, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
771624 (last visited April 18, 2006).  Specifically, Flannery & Samolyk indicate that 
“policymakers and consumer advocates suspect that . . . AFS [Alternative Financial 
Services including payday lending] providers sometimes sell overpriced financial 
services to the people who can least afford them.” Id. 
 2. Id. 
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Rather, this article intends to provide the reader with an objective 
financial analysis, along with conclusions, of seven publicly traded 
payday lenders.  The payday lenders in this study have been analyzed 
against six commercial lenders and one large company with a similar 
business model.3  The study shows that, despite the common belief, 
payday lending firms do not always make extraordinary profits.  In fact, 
when compared to many other well-known lending institutions, payday 
lenders may fall far short in terms of profitability.4  If that is the case, 
then the call for regulation should be based solely in principle, moral, or 
other subjective reasoning—not on high fees.5
This article attempts to shed light upon two specific aspects of the 
payday lending industry.  First, it will provide more information 
regarding the typical payday borrower.6  Next, it provides insightful 
financial data regarding the typical payday lending company.7  New 
information regarding the typical borrower is available from the 
Colorado study as well as from an in-depth investigation by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”).8  Additionally, this article 
discusses the financial and operating results of individual stores within 
one publicly-traded payday lender.9  Finally, by reviewing the operating 
results of seven publicly-traded payday lenders, this article provides 
profitability information upon a relatively unexplored market.10
II. THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF PAYDAY LENDING 
A. The Emergence of Payday Lending 
Methods of providing short-term financial solutions to others are 
not new.  In the early twentieth century, “salary buyers” offered to 
purchase a consumer’s paycheck in advance at a discount.11  For 
instance, a lender would give the borrower $20 today for the right to 
 
 3. See infra Part V. 
 4. See infra Part V. 
 5. See infra Part VI. 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
 7. See discussion infra Part V. 
 8. See Paul Chessin, Borrowing from Peter to Pay Paul: A Statistical Analysis of 
Colorado’s Deferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 387, 391 (2005).  See 
generally Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 1. 
 9. See discussion infra Part V. 
 10. See infra Part V.C–D. 
 11. Chessin, supra note 8, at 391. 
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receive the borrower’s next paycheck of $24.12  This market arose for a 
number of reasons: with many people moving from rural to urban areas, 
and with a significant influx of immigrants, there was a large supply of 
manpower for a small number of jobs.  As a result, meeting cash-needs 
was challenging for many people.  Banks were not offering small-dollar 
short-term cash loans because they were considered too “risky.”  
Additionally, few of the borrowers had assets with which to secure a 
loan.13  The salary-buying industry arose to meet the needs of this 
underserved market.14
In the 1980s, new factors created a similar need for short-term cash 
loans.  The deregulation of the banking industry, the absence of 
traditional small loan providers and the elimination of interest rate caps 
set the stage for the emergence of payday lending.15  As banks 
eliminated less profitable services (such as short-term loan services), 
families and individuals in need of short-term cash flow were left with 
nowhere to turn.16  While the payday lending market emerged at about 
this time, many consider the father of “modern” payday lending to be W. 
Allan Jones, who opened his first Check-Into-Cash operation in 
Cleveland, Tennessee, in 1993.17
The payday lending industry is marked by exceptional growth 
throughout the country.  Recent statistics indicate that the number of 
payday lending stores rose from 10,000 in 2000 to 22,000 in 2004—an 
annual growth rate of 30%.18  In 2002, these stores processed roughly 
180 million transactions19 and in 2003, provided “roughly $40 billion” 
in loans.20
Although many original payday lenders were “mom and pop” 
shops, the industry has consolidated significantly.21  Today, seven of the 
 12. Id. at 392. 
 13. Frances B. Smith, Payday Lending – Lessons From History, CONSUMER’S 
RESEARCH MAGAZINE, April 2003, at 34. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Scott Andrew Schaaf, From Checks to Cash:  The Regulation of the Payday 
Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 340 (2001). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Charles A. Bruch, Taking the Pay Out of Payday Loans:  Putting an End to the 
Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged By Payday Lenders, 69 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1257, 1270 (2001). 
 18. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 1. 
 19. Schaaf, supra note 15, at 340. 
 20. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 1. 
 21. Id. 
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largest payday lenders now have publicly traded stock.22 Large banks 
have also quietly re-entered the market through partnerships with 
payday lenders.23  Although recent FDIC guidelines have changed the 
financial outlook for some of these companies, there is still a prospect 
for continued growth in the industry.24
B. Payday Lending in a Nutshell 
The payday lending industry asserts that payday loans are designed 
to meet short-term cash needs for emergencies such as medical bills or 
car repairs.25  A basic payday lending transaction is fairly 
straightforward.  In order to qualify for a loan, the borrower usually 
needs only a bank account and a job.26  The borrower writes a check for 
a set amount, gives the check to the payday lender, and receives cash of 
some value less than the face amount of the check.  The difference 
between the face value of the check and the amount of cash received 
represents the service charge on the loan.27  The check serves as the only 
form of security on the loan.28  The payday lender agrees not to deposit 
the check for a short period of time (typically two weeks or until 
payday).  On the due date, a borrower with sufficient funds can allow 
 
 22. Lawrence Meyers, Can Payday Lenders Survive?, The Motley Fool, May 16, 
2005, available at http://www.fool.com/news/commentary/2005/commentary 
05051604.htm, last visited April 17, 2006. 
 23. Kari Lydersen, Payday Profiteers: Payday Lenders Target the Working Poor, 
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Oct. 1, 2001, at 9.  The payday lending industry’s growth 
and profitability has caught the attention of many mainstream lenders.  Examples cited 
include the purchase of payday lending businesses by Citigroup and Chase Manhattan 
Bank.  Given the focus of this article, the Author has not investigated whether Citigroup 
and Chase Manhattan Bank currently provide payday lending services. 
 24. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 1. 
 25. Lydersen, supra note 23, at 9.  It is important to note that payday borrowers are 
not required to explain their planned use of borrowed funds, and there are no 
restrictions on the use of borrowed funds.  Also, payday lenders do not inquire about 
whether the borrower is experiencing a financial emergency.  The intended use for 
emergencies is one justification for the service provided by payday lending institutions. 
 26. Bruch, supra note 17, at 1258. 
 27. “The typical payday loan is a two-week loan for around $250 to $300, and the 
typical fees on these loans range from $15 to $20 per $100 borrowed.” Flannery et al, 
supra note 1, at 1.  Note that on a $300 loan, total fees would range from $45 to $60, an 
annualized rate of between 390% and 520% (rate per 100 * 26 [the fee is assessed every 
two weeks, or 26 times per year]). 
 28. Bruch, supra note 17, at 1258. 
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the lender to deposit the original check or pay the loan off with cash.29  
Theoretically, this is how all payday lending transactions should work.30
In reality, most borrowers do not have the funds to pay off the 
original loan.  If this is the case, the options are far less favorable for the 
borrower.  One option is to process a “rollover” or “renewal,” 
effectively extending the loan for another two-week period in exchange 
for a cash payment of additional interest and extension fees.31  Another 
is for the lender to deposit the borrower’s original check, leaving the 
borrower to deal with the high cost of bouncing a check, while still 
owing the payday lender.32  Finally, the borrower could begin a vicious 
cycle: obtain a new loan from a different payday lender, and use the new 
funds to pay off the old debt.33
If payday lending is used as a short-term emergency support 
system, the results are not offensive.  A common analogy is to compare 
payday lending to a taxi cab ride: A taxi provides a very cost-effective 
method to travel between short distances, but can be alarmingly 
expensive for longer trips.34  Similarly, payday lending is effective for 
short-term borrowing, but can lead to objectionable results if used as a 
longer-term credit crutch.  The payday lending industry agrees that 
“these loans are not intended to provide long-term credit, but rather to 
provide a cost-effective way of funding an unexpected short-run cash 
deficiency.”35  While that may be the industry’s intention, it is clearly 
not the way large numbers of consumers use the service. 
C. Why the Uproar? 
Payday loan rollovers and renewals nearly always play a role in 
real-life examples of payday lending gone bad.36  When a borrower does 
not have sufficient cash to repay a loan, one easy option is to rollover or 
renew the loan for another term by paying additional interest or 
extension fees.37  “Rollovers involve payment of only additional fees; 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Lydersen, supra note 23, at 9. 
 31. Bruch, supra note 17, at 1258. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Pay Dirt, THE ECONOMIST, Vol. 351, Issue 8122, pg. 28, June 5, 1999. 
 35. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 1. 
 36. Schaaf, supra note 15, at 345; Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 20. 
 37. Bruch, supra note 17, at 1258. 
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the renewal requires repayment of the loan in full before a new loan is 
extended.”38  Thus, the new loan must be for enough to pay the original 
loan plus the new fees.  The fees associated with the original loan, when 
expressed as an annual percentage rate (“APR”), are astronomical: from 
390% to 7,300%, with an average of 500%.39  In a transaction with no 
rollovers, the associated fees might seem reasonable compared to the 
service provided.  With multiple rollovers, however, the loan term is 
increased to a point where the fees associated with the transaction truly 
approach these APRs, leading to public outrage.  Moreover, payday 
borrowers are not necessarily those voicing outrage.  In fact, one study 
claims that “[c]ustomers have very favorable attitudes towards payday 
advance companies.”40
As a result of the increased public scrutiny on payday lenders, 
many charges have been levied against the industry.  Specifically, 
payday lending is often referred to as “predatory lending,” a phrase that 
lacks a common definition.41  Freddie Mac has defined predatory 
lending as: 
[A] process, often starting with misleading sales tactics, that 
culminates in the origination of a loan to a borrower who is paying 
too much in fees, interest or insurance, may not fully understand or 
was not made aware of all the provisions of the contract, and may 
not have the financial capacity to repay the loan.42
With fees translating into APRs at rates far higher than traditional 
lending mechanisms, payday lenders are easy targets for opponents of 
predatory lending. 
The problems do not stop with high APRs.  Many opponents of 
payday lending accuse the industry of “strategically locating near 
populations of vulnerable borrowers, such as military bases and low-
 38. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 4, n.10. 
 39. Bruch, supra note 17, at 1258. 
 40. Gregory Elliehausen & Edward C. Lawrence, Payday Advance Credit in 
America:  An Analysis of Customer Demand 35, Credit Research Ctr., Georgetown 
Univ., Monograph No. 35 (2001).  This article was funded by the Consumer Financial 
Services Association, a major trade association representing the payday lending 
industry. 
 41. Caroline Wilson, Faces in the Fight Against Predatory Lending, COMMUNITY 
BANKER, October 1, 2001, at 22. 
 42. Id. at 23. 
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income neighborhoods.”43  In addition, many industry opponents charge 
that lenders’ business practices exploit borrowers by providing 
incentives to rollover or renew loans.44
D. Alternatives to Payday Lending—Is it a Necessary Evil? 
Unfortunately, there are not many viable alternatives to payday 
lending.45  Pawn shops are an often-used alternative, but are only 
available to those who have goods and who are willing to part with those 
goods.46  Title pawns are also available to those borrowers who own a 
car.47  The risk of default on these loans is very high in real terms, 
however, since the car may serve as transportation to or from work.  
Upon default, borrowers face not only loss of the car, but potentially the 
loss of a job, leaving them worse off than where they started.48  Rent-to-
Own facilities also offer a potential resource to borrowers who plan to 
use the borrowed funds to purchase some appliance for their home.49  In 
addition, credit cards are available to those with a relatively clean credit 
history. 
Recently, some state credit unions have begun offering short-term 
loan services with relatively low costs.50  Bounce-protection programs 
are available to people who use a bank offering the service, although 
they can be very costly.51  Another alternative to payday loans is to 
borrow from family members, although this may be used less frequently 
because of the associated stress and humiliation.52  Depending on the 
borrower’s situation, each of these alternatives may come with its own 
set of monetary or other social costs.  In the end, choosing a payday loan 
may be the most convenient and cost-effective alternative for some 
people.53
 
 43. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 4. 
 44. Chessin, supra note 8, at 418. 
 45. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 4. 
 46. Bruch, supra note 17, at 1266. 
 47. Id. at 1268. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1269. 
 50. Elizabeth Willoughby, Bankwest v. Baker:  Is it a Mayday for Payday Lenders 
in Rent-A-Charter Arrangements?, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 269, 278 (2005). 
 51. High Fees, High Risk? FDIC issues examination guidance for controversial 
area of bank involvement in payday lending, BANK MARKETING, Oct. 1, 2003, at 10. 
 52. Pay Dirt, supra note 34, at 28. 
 53. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 4. 
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E. The Results of the Uproar 
The controversy over payday lending has had multiple ripple 
effects, with state regulation being the most visible.  Some states have 
enacted laws that “effectively prohibit[]” payday lending.54  Other states 
have enacted laws or regulations specifically addressing payday loans.55  
Finally, in a small number of states, including New Mexico, payday 
lenders are subject to little or no state regulation.56  In the face of both 
regulation and bad press, industry representatives remain resolute that 
they are providing a needed service.57  Noting that the payday lending 
controversy is “as misinformed and as vicious a fight as you’ll ever see,” 
one bank vice president described his bank’s entry into the payday 
lending market as “ugly.”58  In fact, negative publicity has led some 
banks to leave the market entirely.59
III. INDUSTRY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE COST OF PAYDAY SERVICES 
The payday lending industry generally justifies the relatively high 
cost of their services with two justifications.  Before offering these, 
however, industry representatives often assert that their high fees are 
commensurate with the value of the service they provide to consumers.60  
First, the industry argues that payday firms’ services are necessarily 
expensive because the firms’ operating costs are extraordinarily high.61  
While a traditional borrower (someone searching for a car loan or a 
home loan) might search out the lender with the lowest interest rate or 
associated fees, most payday borrowers choose their lender based on 
convenience.62  The cost of providing convenience is high: to compete 
in a local area, payday lenders must operate a high density of stores, and 
 
 54. Schaaf, supra note 15, at 356. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Id. 
 57. Carmen M. Butler & Niloufar A. Park, Mayday Payday:  Can Corporate Social 
Responsibility Save Payday Lenders?, 3 RUTGERS J. L. & URB. POL’Y 119, 123 (2005). 
 58. Michael W. Lynch, Legal Loan Sharking or Essential Service? The Great 
“Payday Loan” Controversy, REASON, Apr. 1, 2002, at 38. 
 59. Dean Foust, Easy Money, BUSINESS WEEK, Apr. 24, 2000, at 107 (discussing 
the planned exit strategy of  Chicago-based Banco Popular from the payday lending 
market). 
 60. Butler & Park, supra note 57, at 123. 
 61. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 4. 
 62. Id. at 10. See also  Schaaf, supra note 15, at 344. 
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keep those stores open beyond normal business hours.63  These two 
factors translate into high occupancy costs (rent) and high wage costs 
(more employees for longer hours).  While this means convenience for 
borrowers, it is possible that service fees are only high enough to offset 
these operating costs and provide some profit. 
Their second justification is a high incidence of default on payday 
loans.64  A default occurs when the lender determines that it will not 
collect the remaining outstanding loan balance.  When the loan is 
“written off” in an accounting sense, the loan is recorded as an 
expense.65  Loan defaults are a lender’s cost of doing business, 
regardless of what type of market the lender is serving.66  The payday 
loan industry contends that their loan losses are high enough to justify 
the cost of their services. 
In order for these justifications to be valid, the loss rates of payday 
lenders must be much higher than the loss rates of traditional lenders 
such as banks.  If a traditional lender (e.g., a bank) can provide loans at 
what is perceived as a reasonable price, yet has the same loss rate as a 
payday lender, then loan losses cannot justify the payday lender’s higher 
fees—i.e., if the other lenders can provide the service profitably, then 
the payday lenders should be able to as well, at a reasonable price. 
According to one study, payday lending customers typically earn 
$28,000 per year.67  Furthermore, to obtain a loan, payday lenders 
require only that the borrower have a checking account and a 
paycheck.68  Given these two factors, it is not unreasonable to think that 
the payday lender’s incidence of default would be much higher than a 
traditional lender.  Unfortunately for payday lenders, however, both of 
these justifications are impossible to verify on a nationwide basis.69  A 
large portion of payday lending firms are privately held, meaning that 
 63. See Schaaf, supra note 15, at 344. 
 64. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 4. 
 65. See generally www2.fdic.gov/qbp/Glossary.asp?menuitem=GLOSSARY (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2006).  This site offers a number of definitions for terms related to the 
lending industry.  Specifically, the definitions for “net charge-offs” and “reserves for 
losses” indicate the associated liabilities for loan write-offs. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Chessin, supra note 8, at 405.  This information is based on demographic 
data collected from borrowers between July 2001 and December 2004 in the State of 
Colorado.  The study encompassed over 22,000 separate loan transactions.  Data from 
other individual states is not available for the purpose of comparison. 
 68. Bruch, supra note 17, at 1258. 
 69. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 4. 
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their financial results are not publicly disclosed.70
Previous articles have cast doubt upon these industry justifications.  
Typically, these articles predict or suggest methods to equalize the 
payday lending market—a conclusion that inherently assumes the 
market is not already perfect.  “Equalization” in this context means 
bringing the price of payday lending down, eliminating inefficient 
payday lending operators and letting the market function with healthy 
competition—this, overall, lowers the high cost of short-term credit for 
borrowers.71
In a perfect market, competitive forces will eliminate excessive 
profits.72  Gas stations serve as a simple example: if two gas stations are 
located at the same busy intersection, their prices are advertised for the 
public to see.  This eliminates the possibility that one of the two gas 
stations can obtain excessive profits, since the consumers are fully 
informed of the gas stations’ prices.  Antitrust laws prevent the gas 
stations from cooperatively setting high prices, so the chance that both 
are achieving excessive profits is very low.  To remain competitive, the 
stations must set prices as low as possible so that they do not lose 
business to the neighboring station, but high enough so that they earn a 
fair profit for providing gas.  In this example, the result is that 
consumers purchasing from one of these stations obtain gas at an 
equilibrium price: the price where supply meets demand, and where 
neither gas station is reaping an excessive profit.73
In the payday lending market, assuming that excessive profits are 
possible, competitive market forces should bring the cost of payday 
loans down to an equilibrium price—a price at which payday lenders are 
allowed a reasonable profit, and excessive profits are eliminated.  If the 
current price of a payday loan were at a fair equilibrium, then a 
perfectly-informed public should not have animosity towards the 
industry.  If, however, the current fees charged by payday lenders are 
unreasonable then payday lenders should, by definition, be earning 
excessive profits. 
In April 2005, one North Carolina Banking Institute (“NCBI”) 
article suggested that greater bank involvement in the payday lending 
 70. Id. 
 71. Michael Bertics, Fixing Payday Lending:  The Potential of Greater Bank 
Involvement, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 133 (2005). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/equilibrium.asp (last visited Aug. 23, 
2006).  This example is a simple demonstration of the market equilibrium concept. 
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market would lead to price equilibrium.74  This article suggested that the 
payday lending market is imperfect: although the price charged by 
payday lenders is stable, the market suffers from a lack of disclosure 
regarding comparable fees between payday lenders.  Consumers are 
prevented from making a selection based on price (e.g., unlike the gas 
stations in the previous example, payday lenders do not advertise their 
fees).75  An imperfect market will persist “when . . . certain factors . . . 
create an incentive for sellers to engage in tacit price collusion . . . .”76  
The article goes on to describe these factors individually, concluding 
that the payday lending market exhibits many of them.77  It then 
suggests that mainstream banks could enter the market and capitalize by 
fully disclosing the prices for their loans.78  By bringing information to 
the market, the article suggests the payday lending market will equalize 
itself. 
The NCBI article makes at least two important assertions.  First, it 
asserts that the justifications offered by the payday lending industry for 
their high prices are, at best, suspect.  Second, the article asserts that the 
typical payday borrower’s characteristics remain undefined.  
Furthermore, according to the article, payday lenders would not be able 
to reap excessive profits in a perfect market79 and thus—regulatory 
roadblocks aside—banks could succeed by simply disclosing their loan 
pricing.80  This claim assumes, however, that price is a key factor in the 
borrower’s selection process. 
Another important article by Carmen M. Butler and Niloufar A. 
Park (“Butler & Park”) has also cast doubt upon the payday lending 
industry’s justifications for high fees.81  Butler & Park suggests that the 
payday lending industry should be regulated through a combination of 
internal and external reform, and argues that internal reform should be 
based on the concept of corporate social responsibility—the idea that a 
company should contribute more to society than it costs society.82  
Based on an in-depth investigation of one publicly-traded payday 
 74. Bertics, supra note 71, at 133. 
 75. Id. at 143. 
 76. Id. at 142. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 150. 
 79. Id. at 142. 
 80. Id. at 150. 
 81. Butler & Park, supra note 57, at 119. 
 82. Id. 
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lending company, Advance America, the article indicates that payday 
lenders “provide substantial income and a favorable rate of return on 
investment.”83  Overall, the article serves as an indictment of the 
industry’s justifications for high prices.  It assumes, however, like the 
NCBI article, that price is a major factor in selecting a payday lender.84
Together, these two articles suggest that the industry’s justifications 
for their fees should be viewed with great skepticism.  Both, however, 
indicate that borrowers’ behavior is inadequately understood.85  For 
states or the federal government to create an effective solution to the 
perceived problems with payday lenders, more information must be 
known about both the borrowers and the lending firms in this market.  
The remainder of this article attempts to provide additional information 
on both subjects. 
IV. THE TYPICAL PAYDAY BORROWER 
The typical payday loan borrower is not easy to describe.  While 
much anecdotal evidence exists regarding the demographic of payday 
borrowers, there is relatively little unbiased and consistent large-scale 
data available.86  Many think that payday lenders largely serve low-
income individuals who have little or no access to traditional methods of 
credit such as credit cards.  In addition, the typical payday borrower is 
thought to have few liquid assets or savings.87  Payday loan borrowers 
are also thought to have a relatively higher debt-to-income ratio, and are 
often thought to be in “financial distress.”88  These borrowers have been 
described in some articles simply as “poor people.”89  While these are 
reasonable intuitive guesses, they can be refuted.  One study indicates 
that most payday loan borrowers are middle-class, have access to other 
forms of credit, have steady jobs, and use payday loans exactly as 
intended—for short-term emergency cash flow problems.90  These 
contradictions exist because much of the available data relating to 
borrowers are “bound up with advocacy positions for or against the 
 83. Id. at 125. 
 84. Id. at 123. 
 85. Id.  See also Bertics, supra note 71, at 150. 
 86. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 4. 
 87. Foust, supra note 59. 
 88. Payday Lending, supra note 13.  See also Bruch, supra note 17, at 1279. 
 89. Jeff Hinkle, Bad Rep or Bad Rap?, AMERICAN INDIAN REPORT, June 2002, at 8. 
 90. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 40, at 33. 
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industry” and thus is of questionable reliability.91
A sampling of the data provides a picture of the inconsistency.  A 
2001 study by Georgetown University’s Credit Research Center at the 
McDonough School of Business indicated that 66% of borrowers use 
payday loans as they are intended—as an emergency cash flow fix.92  
The same report indicates that 60.1% of borrowers renewed their loans 
less than five times in the past year.93  Further, 41.7% of the borrowers 
own homes94 and 100% have steady incomes and checking accounts.95  
Alternatively, a recent study from Indiana indicates that 66% of 
borrowers roll over their loans more than 10 times per year.96  The 
Center for Responsible Lending further identified these inconsistencies 
in a December 2004 Research Report.97  The inconsistencies are not 
limited to the number of loans or the number of rollovers per year.  The 
industry argues that the average borrower has a $35,000 annual 
income.98  The 2001 Georgetown study indicates that over half of 
borrowers have incomes between $25,000 and $49,999, 99 while studies 
from Wisconsin, Illinois, and California point to an average annual 
income of around $25,000 per year.100
The Georgetown study was funded by the Community Financial 
Services Association (“CFSA”), a major trade association of the payday 
 91. Flannery & Samolyck, supra note 1, at 6.
 92. COMMUNITY FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 2002, available 
at http://www.cfsa.net/mediares/Reports/RecapofResearchReportStats.doc (last visited 
April 18, 2006).  The Community Financial Services Association of America (CFSA) is 
the “only national membership trade association that provides services exclusively to 
the Deferred Presentment industry. . . . CFSA members represent approximately two-
thirds of this market segment with over 8,000 stores nationwide.”  http://www.cfsa.net, 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2006).  It is important to note that this report was created and 
distributed by a party that is not independent with relation to the payday lending debate. 
 93. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 40, at 38-39. 
 94. Id. at 42. 
 95. Id. at 50. 
 96. Shane Harris, A Few Bucks Until Payday, Governing Magazine, Dec. 2000, at 
44, 46. 
 97. Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 153 (2004), 
available at http://www.assetbuilding.org/AssetBuilding/Download_Docs/Doc_File_ 
698_1.pdf.
 98. Creola Johnson, Payday Loans:  Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 99 (2002). 
 99. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 40, at 28. 
 100. Johnson, supra note 98, at 99. 
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lending industry.101  Although perhaps tainted by the CFSA’s 
involvement, the study’s results paint an interesting and relatively 
benign picture of the typical payday borrower.  For instance, the study 
found that more than half of the respondents had at least a high school 
diploma or some college education.102  Only 6.2% of the respondents 
had no high school diploma.103  In terms of income, the respondents 
were “less likely than the general population to have either low or higher 
incomes.”104  Furthermore, according to the Georgetown study, the 
majority of borrowers used payday lenders in the manner intended: as a 
short-term cash flow fix.105  65.7% reported using the loans for an 
emergency cash crisis.106  Interestingly, 34.8% reported using payday 
loans no more than four times per year and 22.5% reported using the 
loans 14 times or more per year.107  36.4% of borrowers were under 35 
years of age,108 and more than half were married.109  Just under 25% 
reported being unmarried with children.110
Outside of demographics, the study also provides some insight into 
borrowers’ feelings regarding the availability of credit and the payday 
lending option.  For instance, over 82% of responding borrowers agreed 
that most people benefit from the use of credit.111  But almost 72% 
agreed that the government should impose an interest rate cap on 
lenders, even if it means that fewer consumers will benefit from the 
credit.112  Just over 92% of respondents felt that payday lenders provide 
a useful service,113 although more than 75% also felt that the 
government should limit their fees.114  Finally, over 91% of respondents 
reported using some other form of consumer credit—nearly 10 
percentage points higher than the average population.115
 
 101. Id. at 27-29. 
 102. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 40, at 33. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 28. 
 105. Id. at 47. 
 106. Id.
 107. Id. at 38-39. 
 108. Id. at 29-30. 
 109. Id. at 30. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 33-34. 
 112. Id. at 34-35. 
 113. Id. at 35. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 41. 
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The researchers conclude that payday loan borrowers base their 
decisions on the ease of the process, the ability to obtain fast approvals, 
and the convenience of the store location.116  It is important to note that 
this list does not include the cost of services, although two previously-
discussed articles insinuated that cost was an important factor in the 
borrower’s mind when selecting a payday lender.117
The Georgetown study seems to contradict the conventional 
wisdom.  Based on this study, borrowers have multiple options for 
obtaining credit,118 but choose to use the payday lender even though they 
recognize that the fees are high.119  Borrowers also seem to be using 
payday loans as the industry intends,120 although almost a quarter of 
users do have a high number of payday loans per year.121  Overall, 
though, this study does not raise red flags regarding the service and 
charges provided by the payday lending industry.122  While users do feel 
like price controls would be valuable, this must be taken in context.  For 
instance, it is likely that most people who buy gasoline for their car wish 
for the government to place a cap on the price of a gallon of gasoline, 
simply because it would benefit them.123
In 2001, the North Carolina Banking Institute published an article 
that indicates a more alarming trend among payday borrowers.  
According to the article, a Wall Street Journal industry analyst claimed 
that the average borrower “makes 11 transactions [per] year.”124  
Another study indicated the average was 10 transactions per year.125  
Similarly, one other study indicated an average of over 12 times per 
year.126  In 2005, another article indicated that, in Illinois, 20% of 
 116. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 6. 
 117. Butler & Park, supra note 57, at 123; Bertics, supra note 71, at 150. 
 118. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 40, at 41-43. 
 119. Id. at 48-50. 
 120. Id. at 47. 
 121. Id. at 38-39. 
 122. One interesting factor that is not analyzed in this data is gender.  Studies from 
Wisconsin and Illinois have reported that a majority of payday borrowers are female. 
See Johnson, supra note 98, at 100. 
 123. See http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/homoeconomicus.asp (last visited 
Aug. 23, 2006) (explaining the common theory regarding individuals as rational self 
maximizers: on an individual basis, people make choices that provide the most financial 
benefit to their own lives). 
 124. Schaaf, supra note 15, at 346. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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borrowers take out 20 or more loans per year.127
Experience in Colorado calls into question the Georgetown results, 
and lends credence to the North Carolina Banking Institute figures.  In 
2000, Colorado enacted the Deferred Deposit Loan Act as an attempt to 
combat the “high-cost” payday loan.128  The regulations required payday 
lenders within the state to collect and report demographic data regarding 
borrowers.129
Based on data collected between July 2001 and December 2004, the 
demographics of payday borrowers in Colorado indicate that the typical 
borrower was a 36 year old single woman making just over $28,000 per 
year.130  Sixty-two percent of borrowers were between the ages of 20 
and 39 years old, and 55% were women.131  Married borrowers 
accounted for 47% of the total loans, and more than 22% of borrowers 
had been employed at their current job for less than six months.132  
Sixty-three percent of borrowers made less than $30,000 per year, and 
only one-quarter of one percent, or 0.24%, made more than $50,000 per 
year.133  On average, the borrower took out just over 9 loans per year, 
from the same lender.  This does not account for loans taken out from 
different lenders.134  Moreover, 20% of borrowers took out 16 or more 
loans with the same lender within a 12 month period.135  These repeat 
borrowers constituted over 46% of all loans written by a particular 
lender.136  Interestingly, 18.85% of loans were renewals, a figure that 
increased over the years analyzed from 19.56% in 2003 to 20.28% in 
2004.137  Similarly, 34.4% of loans were rollovers.138  This figure has 
been increasing in recent years: 34.7% in 2003, and 37.48% in 2004.139  
Based on this information, the study concludes that there is “a gaping 
disconnect between the theory and expressed purpose of payday 
 127. Willoughby, supra note 50, at 272. 
 128. Chessin, supra note 8, at 387. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 404-05. 
 131. Id. at 405. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 406-07. 
 134. Id. at 410. 
 135. Id. at 411. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 413. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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loans . . . and their reality.”140
In comparing the Georgetown and Colorado studies, it appears that 
the design of the Georgetown study limits its usefulness.  By grouping 
the income bracket between $25,000 and $49,999, the Georgetown study 
missed an opportunity to provide valuable information regarding 
subcategories within this income bracket.  For instance, the Colorado 
study indicates that the average income of borrowers is $28,000.141  
Other studies mentioned above provide consistent results, with average 
incomes near $25,000.142  The Georgetown study might well indicate 
similar results, but it does not provide readers with an average income 
but rather an income bracket.143
The Georgetown study is clearly contradicted by the Colorado 
study with respect to the use of payday loans by individuals in the 
income bracket above $50,000.  The Georgetown study claims that 25% 
of respondents had incomes above $50,000, while the Colorado study 
indicates that only 0.24% of respondents are within this income 
bracket.144  Common sense could support the Colorado results because it 
appears that the conventional wisdom is correct in this regard: payday 
lenders are clearly serving lower-income individuals with much more 
frequency than higher-income individuals. 
While the Colorado study does not indicate how borrowers used 
payday loan funds, both the Georgetown and Colorado studies suggest 
that a high percentage of borrowers use payday loans for non-emergency 
reasons.  Although the Georgetown study claims that a majority of 
borrowers use funds for emergency reasons, the high percentage of 
borrowers having at least 7 loans per year (almost 50%) indicates that 
either the borrowers had a drastic financial emergency, a high incidence 
of emergencies, or are using the payday loan as a longer-term cash flow 
crutch.145  This is bolstered by the high percentage of borrowers who 
incur more than 14 loans per year (22%).146
Although the Georgetown study does not calculate an average 
 140. Id. at 418. 
 141. Id. at 406. 
 142. Johnson, supra note 98, at 99. 
 143. Perhaps, for instance, most of the Georgetown respondents are included within 
the $25,000-$29,999 subcategory of the $25,000-$49,999 category.  Without more 
information, one cannot ascertain the reliability of the Georgetown study. 
 144. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 40, at 29; Chessin, supra note 8, at 406. 
 145. Elliehausen & Lawrence, supra note 40, at 39. 
 146. Id. 
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number of loans per borrower per year, calculations from the study’s 
data indicate that the average number of loans would be near 10.  
Similarly, the Colorado study shows that the average borrower takes out 
9 payday loans per year, and that about 20% take out at least 16 loans 
per year.147  Again, this information suggests that borrowers, on average, 
are not using payday loans exclusively (or even remotely) for emergency 
reasons.  The industry’s suggestion that the product is designed to be 
used for emergencies may be correct in theory, but it ignores the reality: 
payday borrowers are using the product with a frequency that suggests 
their only “emergency” is that their bank account is low.  This is not 
intended to suggest that a lack of funds is a trivial thing; the industry’s 
justifications, however, clearly paint a different picture of “emergency.”  
Nevertheless, it does appear that lower-income people have a need for a 
relatively short-term unsecured financial vehicle.  Some states have 
completely outlawed payday lending; yet this only leaves the intended 
borrower with an unfulfilled need and an incentive to find alternatives 
that are scarce and possibly illegal.148
It would be valuable to know with certainty how payday borrowers 
use the proceeds from the loan.  If it were known, for example, that 
borrowers used the funds for non-essential items, then a systematic 
campaign of consumer-education might be implemented in response.  
Similarly, it would be helpful to know what conditions bring payday 
borrowers to the breaking point—the point at which they decide to 
obtain their first payday loan.  It is entirely possible that the rise in 
payday loans is a result of the wide-spread decrease in personal savings.  
Without a deeper understanding of this subject, however, any 
constructive responses to payday lending may be destined for failure.  
Thus, since its wholesale elimination does not appear to be a viable 
solution, it is time for a closer examination of the source of payday 
lending’s profitability. 
V. PAYDAY LENDING: COSTLY AND NOT PROFITABLE? 
When asked to justify the high fees associated with payday lending, 
 147. Chessin, supra note 8, at 410-11. 
 148. Taking an optimistic perspective, the author does note that one possible result 
stemming from a state regulating or completely outlawing payday lending is that 
potential borrowers would engage in more effective financial planning.  This may lead 
to a reduction in the need for short-term infusions of cash such as that provided by 
payday lenders. 
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industry representatives fall back on two key financial aspects of the 
industry.  First, operating costs are very high for a payday lender.  
Second, the incidence of losses (i.e. loans that are never repaid) is much 
higher than that of a mainstream financial institution.149  Analyzing the 
truth of these contentions is difficult: most payday lending firms will not 
voluntarily disclose the financial results of their operations.150  Unless a 
company is publicly traded, it is nearly impossible to obtain relevant and 
complete financial data.  As a result, this article is focused on one study 
involving financial information voluntarily disclosed by two payday 
lenders, and on the Author’s own study involving financial analysis of 
seven publicly-traded payday lenders.151
A. Expenses of Payday Lenders 
In 2005, two FDIC employees (“Flannert & Samolyk”) published 
an insightful study regarding the costs of payday lending.152  After 
obtaining “proprietary store-level data” from two large payday lending 
companies, Flannery & Samolyk performed a comprehensive financial 
analysis of store operations and profitability.153  Their objective was to 
test whether or not operating expenses and loan losses were truly high 
enough to justify the high service fees charged by payday lenders.154  In 
the end, they determined that “fixed operating costs and loan loss rates 
do justify a large part of the high APRs charged on payday advance 
loans.”155
Flannery & Samolyk found that default rates and loan losses of 
payday lenders are much higher than typical credit losses at mainstream 
financial institutions.156  Loan losses occur when a specific loan is 
deemed uncollectible or in default.  At that time, the lender will 
effectively record the loan balance as an expense, commonly referred to 
as “writing the loan off.”  For ease of comparison, loan losses can be 
measured as a percentage of total revenues.  In their study, Flannery & 
Samolyk found that the ratio of mean loan losses to total revenue 
 
 149. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 4. 
 150. Id. at 1. 
 151. Id. at 7; see also infra Part V.B.
 152. See generally Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 7. 
 153. Id. at 7. 
 154. Id. at 1. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 2. 
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amounted to 15.1%.157  Flannery & Samolyk also found that loan losses 
as a percentage of store operating costs for “young” stores (those 
operating for at least 1 year and not more than 4 years) was 24.8%.158  
Although they indicate that this is “substantially” higher than the 
customary loan loss rates at mainstream financial institutions, they do 
not provide any comparative data.159   
The Flannery & Samolyk data also indicate that new stores are 
profitable only after several years of operation when loan-origination 
finally reaches a certain volume.160  The typical store employs three full-
time workers, each earning approximately $30,000 per year including 
benefits.161  Fixed costs are increased by maintaining longer hours of 
operation relative to those of typical financial institutions.162  Since the 
Flannery & Samolyk study indicates that customers are not shopping 
based on price, but rather on convenience,163 the added costs of longer 
hours and full-time employees are necessary to obtain, serve, and retain 
their customers. 
The most successful payday lending stores offset these fixed 
operating costs by processing a large volume of loans.164  As the number 
of loans processed increases, store profitability increases as well.165  
Therefore, repeat borrowers, the source of a heated policy debate, do not 
inherently increase a store’s profitability—they simply add to the loan 
volume of a particular store.166  Flannery & Samolyk document some 
interesting findings with respect to repeat borrowers and store 
profitability.  For both young (defined as operating between 1 and 4 
years) and mature (defined as operating for more than 4 years) stores, 
46% of total loan volume came from renewals or rollovers.167  For 
mature stores, more than 30% of borrowers received 12 or more loans 
per year.168  These figures relate to a specific store versus a company as 
 157. Id. at 16. 
 158. Id. at 10. 
 159. Id. at 2. 
 160. Id. at 2. 
 161. Id. at 9. 
 162. Schaaf, supra note 15, at 345. 
 163. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 10; see also Schaaf, supra note 15, at 
345. 
 164. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 10. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 12. 
 168. Id. 
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a whole.  Even while faced with these fixed operating costs and high 
loan losses, a typical payday lending store creates 33.2% profit before 
accounting for regional or corporate expenses.169  This means that for 
every dollar charged in fees, the store itself will profit more than 33 
cents—before accounting for regional or corporate shared administrative 
costs. 
The Flannery study could be improved by providing a 
comprehensive comparison of payday lenders with those of another 
commercial lender or other franchise-type business.  Without more, the 
numbers lack a benchmark.  For instance, the payday lending industry 
argues that high loan losses and high fixed operating costs drive the high 
cost of lending.170  There is no evidence, however, that payday loan 
losses are higher than loss rates for typical commercial lenders.  
Although Flannery & Samolyk make the claim, there is no hard data 
provided to support it.171  Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the 
payday lender loss rates are normal for all lenders, then the industry’s 
justifications for high fees is not sufficient.  The same could be true of 
payday lenders’ fixed operating costs—if they are consistent with other 
franchised businesses, the industry’s justification rings hollow. 
B. Comparing Payday Lenders to Mainstream Lenders 
To provide more insight into the relative costs and profitability of 
payday lending, this article analyzes financial data from seven publicly-
traded payday lenders.  A comparative analysis was performed for six 
publicly-traded commercial lenders and one publicly-traded company 
with a business model similar to payday lenders.  The results of this 
study are based on a comparison between these two groups of 
companies. 
1. Methodology 
This study began by identifying the seven publicly-traded payday 
lending companies.  These companies, listed in Exhibit 1, are the only 
publicly-traded companies whose primary or secondary line of business 
consists of originating payday loans.  Within this group, three 
companies’ primary line of business is pawn.  Exhibit 1 also indicates 
 
 169. Id. at 18. 
 170. Id. at 4. 
 171. Id. at 10. 
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the percentage of revenues which are derived from pawn services. 
Next, six comparison companies were selected based on experience 
and relative success in the commercial lending industry.  All six 
companies, listed Exhibit 2, are also publicly traded.  One of the six, 
Collegiate Funding, is specifically focused on servicing student loans.  
In addition to these six, Starbucks Corp. (“Starbucks”) was selected to 
provide comparison data for store and regional expenses as a percentage 
of revenue, primarily due to similarities in its business model.172
The source data for this financial analysis was obtained from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).  Publicly traded 
companies are required to file certain information with the SEC which is 
available online through the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis 
and Retrieval system (“EDGAR”).  This study does not include 
comparisons of any privately held payday lending firms because, as 
Flannery & Samolyk noted, the information for such firms is simply not 
available to the public.173  Financial information was obtained from the 
SEC for both the payday lenders and the comparison companies.174  A 
recent 10-Q (a quarterly report of financial results filed with the SEC) 
was selected for each company.  In all cases, an attempt was made to 
select the same quarter for the sake of consistency. 
Once the company data was collected, certain analytical ratios were 
defined for comparison.  These ratios are identified and explained in 
Exhibit 3.  Each of these ratios was selected with a focus on testing 
 172. Most large payday lending companies, including the seven investigated in this 
study, operate a high density of stores within a broad range of geographic locations.  In 
a major metropolitan area, a payday lending company will have multiple locations.  
Similarly, Starbucks typically operates a high density of stores in a specific geographic 
location as well, with a high number of locations per major metropolitan city.   
Financially, both Starbucks and payday lenders review results on a per-store basis as 
well as on an overall basis.  In addition, and perhaps most importantly, Starbucks 
encounters similar types of fixed operating costs, such as rent and other store-specific 
expenses.  These similar expenses allow for a good comparison to test the assertion that 
payday lenders’ fixed operating costs are high. 
 173. Id. at 2. 
 174. The EDGAR database must be accessed through the website of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission.  It can be found at www.sec.gov/index.htm.  To search the 
EDGAR database from this site, the user must select the link labeled “Filings and 
Forms.”  On the next page, the user must select the link labeled “Search for Company 
Filings.”  Finally, the user can now perform a general search for companies and other 
filers.  Search options include Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, ticker 
symbol, and name.  Once the company is selected, any specific SEC filing can be 
obtained, provided that it has been entered into the EDGAR database. 
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whether or not payday lenders earn a significant profit compared to 
other lending entities.  Also, certain ratios were selected to determine 
whether the loan loss experienced at payday lenders is consistent with 
the experience of other commercial lenders.  Each ratio has been 
computed using two groups of the seven payday lenders.  The first 
group, titled “Pure PDL,” includes only the four publicly-traded payday 
lenders whose primary line of business is payday lending—it excludes 
the three payday lenders with significant pawn operations.  The next 
group, titled “PDL and Hybrid,” is calculated using financial data from 
all seven publicly traded payday lenders.  The results for commercial 
lenders have been compared to the “Pure PDL” group information to 
facilitate understanding the true differences between these industries. 
2. Shortcomings 
This study has several shortcomings that stem from the nature of 
the comparisons.  In all cases, every effort has been made to provide the 
correct and most equal comparison.  Although this study is not perfect, it 
provides a solid entry point for a student hoping to do further research 
on the topic.  First, the study uses financial data from one three-month 
period of time.  For all but three companies, the study used the same 
period of time in the hopes that economic events occurring before or 
during this span of time would affect all companies equally.  It is 
important to note that this “timespan” problem is inherent in any 
analytical study.  Over time, financial performance (and thus ratios 
analyzing that performance) will undoubtedly change.  By looking at 
one single period of time, however, trends should fall out to provide 
insight into a comparison of these companies. 
Second, there is no standard form of disclosure for publicly traded 
companies.  For instance, the line item “store expense” on an income 
statement might include different items for Company A versus Company 
B, even though those companies are in the same industry.  In cases 
where this problem was clear, manual calculations were made to ensure 
the comparisons took into account consistent expense and revenue 
information. 
Third, “quality of earnings,” is one factor that is unique to publicly-
traded companies.  In an effort to meet industry analyst expectations for 
quarterly ratios like earnings per share, publicly traded companies 
sometimes adjust reserves, or contingent liability accounts, to meet 
projected earnings.  A reduction in a reserve account will reduce 
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previously-recorded expenses, leading to higher earnings.  Conversely, 
an increased reserve account (resulting from recording an expense) will 
reduce earnings.  Loan losses, discussed at length throughout this article, 
are just such a reserve.  There is no reason to suggest that a quality of 
earnings issue exists in this case; quality of earnings can be a natural 
shortcoming when dealing with publicly traded companies.175
Fourth, the payday lending industry and the commercial lending 
industry are serving neither the same customers nor the same markets.  
Therefore, because these industries are different, a certain portion of the 
difference between ratios can be explained by this industry differential.  
Defining how much is quite another matter.  Certain ratios are affected 
by industry differences more than others.  For instance, loan losses 
should be less for commercial lenders who perform more due diligence 
on borrowers.  However, ratios such as profit margin, should provide a 
solid footing for comparison regardless of industry. 
Fifth, a company’s financial ratios reflect the quality of company 
management.  If there is a poor management team leading a company, 
chances are good that their ratios will not be as strong as a neighbor 
company, in the same industry and selling the same goods, which has a 
great management team.  This is a flaw that is inherent in any analysis 
that deals with financial data; a study cannot measure the impact of a 
poor management team. 
Finally, this study reviews data at a high-level of generality from 
publicly-traded payday lenders and does not review any data from 
privately-held payday lenders.  Reviewing Exhibit 1, this study includes 
data from nearly 8,000 payday lending stores.  By comparison, Flannery 
& Samolyk reviewed data from 300 stores from two major payday 
lenders—600 stores in total.176  Recent estimates peg the number of 
payday lending stores nationwide at 22,000 in 2004.177  Thus, this study 
covers nearly 36% of the total payday lending stores across the nation.  
Although it does not include privately-held firms, the data is sufficient to 
provide insight into the payday lending industry.178
 175. See generally http://www.investopedia.com/terms/q/qualityofearnings.asp, last 
visited August 18, 2006, for a definition of Quality of Earnings.  Quality of earnings 
concerns can arise related to almost any estimated reserve (liability) account, such as 
loan losses at payday lenders. 
 176. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 7. 
 177. Id. at 1. 
 178. Despite these potential shortcomings, this study’s results are fairly consistent 
with the findings of Flannery & Samolyk for certain financial ratios. 
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3. Conclusion 
This study finds that the industry’s proffered justifications for high 
service fees, and by extension high APRs, may be justified by both high 
store expenses and high loan losses.  In addition, this study finds that 
payday lender profit margins are less than half that of their mainstream 
lending counterparts.  The study also indicates that pawn operations 
significantly enhance the profitability of payday lending companies. 
C. Profitability Analysis 
Payday lending operations averaged a 7.63% profit margin on 
average revenue per store of just over $80,000.  For the “Pure PDLs,” 
average revenue per store was reduced to $63,233.  A review of the 
source data indicates that there is a difference between pure payday 
lenders and pawn operators with respect to this ratio.  The best-
performing pure payday lender generated $6,000 less in revenues per 
store when compared to the lowest-ranking pawn operator. 
This trend continues with average operating margins.  For payday 
lenders, average operating margins indicate revenue before accounting 
for administrative or headquarters expenses.  In essence, this is a 
measure of revenue after accounting for store operating costs.  For pure 
payday lenders, average per-store operating margins (revenues less costs 
of store operations) are 24.64%.  For those with pawn operations, the 
figure jumps to 31.99%.  It is interesting to note that Flannery & 
Samolyk made similar findings: average operating profits at stores 
studied was calculated at 33.2%, very close to the 31.99% figure 
presented above. 
Similarly, average profit margins also indicate that pawn operations 
contribute to firm profitability.  Profit margins indicate the percentage of 
gross revenue that truly is profit for the firm—the percentage of gross 
revenue that remains after subtracting out all associated costs for the 
period.  For pure payday lenders, the average profit margin was 3.57%.  
When including pawn operators, this figure more than doubles to 7.63%. 
These figures indicate that payday lenders are not overly profitable 
organizations.  Contrary to conventional wisdom, these firms fall far 
short of profits for mainstream commercial lenders.  In addition, profit 
margins of payday lenders are far below those of Starbucks.  The profit 
margins of Starbucks for the measured time period were just over 9%.  
This is almost 2% more than all payday lenders, and more than double 
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the pure-payday lenders.  These figures indicate that arguments against 
payday lending, couched in terms of preventing excessive profits, are 
unfounded.  If companies should be limited to a certain profitability 
measure, citizens would be better off fighting Starbucks than their local 
payday lender.179
Comparing the profit margins of payday lenders to mainstream 
commercial lenders supports this perspective.  The comparison lenders 
had a profit margin of 13.04%—much higher than even Starbucks.  This 
was over three times the percentage for pure payday lenders, and almost 
twice as much when including hybrid operators.  These profits are not 
being made by small, unknown or niche lenders.  These are mainstream 
companies with widely-recognized names: Capital One, GE Capital, 
HSBC, Money Tree, and American Express Credit.180
D. Expense Analysis 
These findings seem hard to understand in light of the service fees 
charged by payday lenders.  According to the Flannery & Samolyk 
study’s data, the average fee charged by payday lenders is $17.71 per 
$100 advanced.181  An analysis of expenses related to payday lending 
operations sheds some light on this problem.  First, the industry’s 
contention that operating expenses are high is bolstered by this study.  
Store expenses account for 75% and 68% of gross revenues for pure 
payday and hybrid payday operators, respectively.  The same figure for 
 
 179. The author does recognize that payday lending may create and perpetuate 
financial harm for many borrowers.  The intent of this article is to question the assertion 
that payday lenders generate excessive profits.  If payday lenders are not generating 
excessive profits, then industry regulation should be based on some other foundation 
such as a moral or ethical principle.  Claims that payday lenders generate excessive 
profits, if unfounded, mislead the debate over payday lending. 
 180. One could argue that payday lenders should be held to a higher standard 
because they cater to a lower-income market than traditional lenders.  One comparison 
company provides services to a relatively similar market (i.e., students) and should 
arguably be held to a similar standard.  Nevertheless, Collegiate Funding Services, a 
“leading education finance company,” had above-average profitability of 14.69%.  See 
http://www.cfsloans.com/index.cfm?action=aboutUs (last visited August 25, 2006). 
One could differentiate Collegiate Funding Services on the basis of borrower’s expected 
future earnings.  Either way, this does not change the implication of this study:  In light 
of the data analyzed and presented, arguments against payday lenders on the basis of 
excessive profits appear to be unfounded. 
 181. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 1, at 9. 
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Starbucks, a similar business model, is less than half of either of these, at 
32%. 
Three primary items account for a majority of store expenses: 
wages, occupancy costs, and loan losses.  High wages are a function of 
payday lenders’ operating hours.  With longer hours than traditional 
lending institutions, it makes sense that these operators would incur a 
higher cost of wages.  In addition, payday lenders operate a high volume 
of stores, leading to high occupancy costs.  In the Flannery & Samolyk 
study, wages and occupancy costs account for nearly 50% of a store’s 
operating costs.182  These two cost categories are not a function of the 
lending operations.  Rather, they are a function of the business model.  If 
convenience is the primary factor in selecting a payday lender,183 then 
payday lenders must keep their long hours and high store density if they 
expect to continue their growth. 
Loan losses account for a very high percentage of operating costs as 
well.  This study found that loan losses at pure payday lenders amounted 
to just over 26% of store operating costs.  Including hybrids, this figure 
dropped to just under 22%.  Using Flannery & Samolyk’s data, on 
average loan losses constituted 23% of a store’s operating costs.184  
While these costs appear high, it is nearly impossible to compare them 
with information from any of the comparison companies as the 
comparison companies do not distinguish store expenses from 
headquarter or regional expenses. 
Calculating bad debt expense as a percentage of revenue, however, 
does provide a stable basis for comparison.  This calculation provides 
the impact of loan losses on company operations.  A low rate indicates 
good loss experience, or a low incidence of defaults.  Higher rates 
indicate that loan losses are reducing the company’s profitability.  For 
pure payday lenders, loan losses amount to just over 20% of revenues.  
When hybrids are included, this figure drops to 15.5%.  In comparison, 
Flannery & Samolyk calculated loan losses at 15.1%.185  The 
mainstream lenders produced a surprising result: loan losses amounted 
to 16.6% of revenue—close to that of payday lenders. 
An alternative perspective sheds some light on this interesting 
result.  Loan losses as a percentage of outstanding loans at payday 
 182. Id. at 10. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 16. 
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lenders amounted to 25% for pure payday lenders, and 17.6% for hybrid 
payday lenders.  In comparison, loan losses at commercial lenders 
amounted to just over 5% of outstanding loans.  This is consistent with 
conventional wisdom; although the loan losses in a given period may be 
close when counting in dollars, the commercial lenders have a 
significantly larger loan portfolio and are earning a much lower 
(relative) rate of interest.  Whether this means that commercial lenders 
have a lower incidence of default cannot be ascertained.  Without 
knowing the average loan principal at the comparison companies, it is 
impossible to measure the default rate.  This information would be 
useful to know, and could be the subject of future investigations. 
It is clear that loan losses significantly reduce the profitability of 
payday lending firms.  It does not, however, appear that the payday 
lending loan losses are unusually high relative to commercial lending in 
general.  These facts tend to weaken the industry’s arguments that 
payday loan losses are very high: the loan losses may be high, but that 
seems to be a trait of the lending industry generally, rather than a unique 
trait of payday lending institutions.186
VI. CONCLUSION 
The payday lending industry has experienced high growth and 
increasing notoriety over the past decade.  Calls for regulating the 
industry are based partially on an assumption that payday lenders 
 186. While the ratio of loan losses to revenue is insightful, it can be misleading.  
Loans are not recorded as revenue for any lender, including payday lenders.  Loans are 
recorded as an asset, specifically a receivable.  The profits from loans are recorded as 
revenue, mostly in the nature of interest income or finance charges.  To determine the 
true extent of loan defaults for payday lenders, one must calculate the default rate. 
These loan loss ratios can provide insight into the percentage of borrowers who default, 
termed the default rate.  This calculation can be demonstrated using average loan 
statistics.  Assuming that the true rate of loan losses as a percentage of revenue (20%) is 
correct, the average loan for a young store from Flannery & Samolyk was $230, with an 
average finance charge of $38.57.  This produces a net loan of $191.43.  Using this 
information, it is possible to calculate backwards to an expected default rate.  Writing 
off this particular loan, a lender will record an expense of $191.43.  This means that the 
lender is, on average, going to record $943 in revenue ($191.43/20%) before writing off 
this loan.  Based on the average finance charge, this means that the lender will have 
processed just over 24 transactions before the loan defaults ($943/$38.57).  This 
translates to a default rate of nearly 4.1% (1/24), much lower than conventional wisdom 
would have the public believe.  This calculation is demonstrated in detail in Exhibit 5. 
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generate enormous profits from the high cost of borrowing.  High profits 
for payday lenders, however, may be more myth than reality. 
Consistent with industry explanations, operating expenses for 
payday lenders are high.  Wages, occupancy costs, and loan losses 
account for a majority of these high operating costs.  These expenses are 
incurred to promote customer convenience.  In order to provide a 
valuable service, payday lenders choose to keep longer business hours 
and operate a higher density of stores than traditional lenders such as 
banks.  The cost of convenience is lower profitability.  An interesting 
extension of this research would be to determine whether this trend 
(buying on convenience) would continue if payday lenders were forced 
to conspicuously display their lending costs to the public at their place of 
business. 
Additional unbiased study of borrowers and payday lenders would 
help to find an effective solution to the current situation.  Although a 
large amount of research and scholarly writing regarding payday lending 
is currently available, most studies can be associated with either a 
consumer advocate or industry position.  This has led to contradictory 
information and confusion.  While this information serves to further the 
particular ambitions of each side, it does little to advance efforts for fair 
regulation.  If more unbiased information were available, legislators 
would be presented with a true picture of both payday borrowers and the 
payday lending industry.  This information could lead the payday 
lending industry and government to cooperative guidelines for providing 
this necessary service. 
Before enacting payday lending legislation, states should refrain 
from acting in haste.  Although the public may harbor animosity toward 
the industry, legislators would be wise to carefully consider and study 
the industry’s explanations of its operating costs and profitability.  Since 
payday lenders process 180 million transactions per year, amounting to 
$40 billion in loaned dollars, state governments should heed the words 
of Jeremy Bentham: 
But the fact is, he cannot get [a loan] at that lower rate . . . . The 
legislator . . . who knows nothing at all about the matter, comes and 
says to him[,] “[Y]ou shall not have the money: for it would be doing 
you a mischief to let you borrow it upon such terms.” . . . There may 
be worse cruelty, but can there be greater folly?187
 187. Frances B. Smith, Payday Lending – Lessons from History, CONSUMER’S 
RESEARCH MAGAZINE, April 1, 2003, at 34. 
